Efficiency of Small Business Management in the Communications Industry: Simulation of the Competitive Environment  by Plotnikov, Vladimir & Leontyev, Evgeniy
 Procedia Economics and Finance  27 ( 2015 )  177 – 185 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
2212-5671 © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of Faculty of Economic Sciences, “Lucian Blaga” University of Sibiu”
doi: 10.1016/S2212-5671(15)00987-9 
ScienceDirect
22nd International Economic Conference – IECS 2015 “Economic Prospects in the Context of 
Growing Global and Regional Interdependencies”, IECS 2015 
Efficiency of Small Business Management in the Communications 
Industry: Simulation of the Competitive Environment  
Vladimir Plotnikova,*, Evgeniy Leontyevb 
aSaint-Petersburg State University of Economics, Sadovaya str., 21, Saint-Petersburg, 191023, Russia 
bSouthwest State University, 50 let Oktyabrya str., 94, Kursk, 305040, Russia  
Abstract 
The level of management in a small business is not always high. Therefore, the need has to develop evidence-based 
recommendations for the effective management in a highly competitive market. The aim of this study is to develop a model 
assessing the impact of competitive environment on the effectiveness of strategic management of a small business in the 
telecommunications industry. We have taken into account in this model specifics of Russian small businesses, including in the 
telecommunications sector. The basis of our model were known mathematical models of competition in the market – the model of 
Cournot oligopoly and the model of Stackelberg duopoly. According to the results of simulation, the authors have proposed the use 
of 4 typical control strategies. Conditions of their application have also been identified. Approbation of the author's model is made 
on the example of small business communication of Russia. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Nowadays there are many operators in the Russian telecommunications market, that are mutually influencing each 
other's incomes and expenditures through rates, technical infrastructure, the proportion of the total number of 
subscribers from potential clients and other indicators (Potapenko and Leontyev, 2013).  
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The magnitude of the problem is illustrated by the fact that in the period 2002-2012 years number of 
telecommunication companies in Russia has risen from 3,1 thousand to 28,3 thousand. It should be noted that 
telecommunications companies, like business in general, differentiated by size. Most of companies in the economy 
are small (at the end of 2012 - 4645.7 thousand units), but they account for a small portion of the goods and services 
produced (contribution of small and medium-sized businesses in the country's GDP is around 20% at the end of 2012) 
(Russia in figures, 2014). 
The most significant competitive pressure is for to small telecommunication companies with relatively few 
resources and, consequently, low resistance to the adverse shocks of the competitive environment (Vertakova and 
Plotnikov, 2013a). Based on that moment, it is proposed to the model for assessing the impact of the competitive 
environment in the effective management of a small telecommunication companies and the method of evaluation. 
There are several variations of the market operator: 
 Accommodation operator on an unoccupied territory (without competitors) 
 The simultaneous development of the operator and the competitors 
 Accommodation in the territory, has already mastered the competitors 
 Competitors come to the territory developed by the operator 
Development of new segments in the market not occupied by competitors, allows the operator to fully implement specific 
services at prices and with characteristics, limited only by the legal system of the industry. In the absence of competitors, 
potential clients will be willing to operator services. Therefore, the apparent effect of competitors in this case does not exist 
(Brackman and Heijdra, 2001; Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1998; Vertakova and Plotnikov, 2013b; etc.). 
2. Strategy of simultaneous independent development  
Consider other cases interaction operator and competitors. To do this, let us take the famous mathematical models 
of market competition are Cournot competition and Stackelberg leadership model (Daughety, 1989; Kalashnikov and 
Flores, 2012; Meyer, 1978; Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2009; etc.).  
The total volume of rendered services will be expressed in the following ratio: 
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The price for the service is the function of the total number of services provided by operators of telecommunications 
services: 
)v...vQ(vQ(V)q n21     (2) 
Demand for services is diminishing linear function: 
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– the number of operators in the market. 
Profit of operators will be the target function, which depends on the costs incurred by the operators, and the prices 
of services: 
iiii vrvqP      
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where r
 
 – the cost per unit of service. 
If the market with the linear demand has n operators, and the costs are proportional to the volume of production, 
the profit function is: 
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For each operator there is the question of profit maximization and the appointment of best prices for their services. 
Best price means the price where the subscribers for a given quality of service will choose the services of this operator, 
and operator service will be most profitable. 
To maximize profits, the operator can control the amount of service products and influence the demand for these 
services. Therefore, it is necessary to find maximum profit function with limited services. 
Substituting the expression in equation 3: 
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To maximize the profit function the curried function is equal to zero: 
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In this case, the amount of the services provided by the operator does not depend on the volume of services to a 
competitor. It follows from this definition of the equilibrium output for each player on the market: 
.
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The total volume of services provided will take the form: 
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when the equilibrium price: 
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This means that the current price and selling on the market do not change if an average for the two operators of the 
unit cost of the service. Thus, if one operator's services became more expensive on the unit, and the other is cheaper 
on the unit, the only thing that can be expected is the increase in the market share held by the company that minimized 
costs. 
Because such equilibrium in the market has a small probability, it is advisable to consider a situation where each 
player changes its output in line with the actions of the competitor. 
3. Strategy of a leader  
Consider a situation where the operator on a busy site, a new operator-competitor - Stackelberg duopoly, is a 
situation, when the choice of output is carried out consistently: "firm-leader" (the first company) understands that 
expanding their scope of services and, consequently, lower prices making industry less profitable, and forces the 
competitor to reduce their production volume. Rationally valid competitor ("follower company") maximizes its profits 
by acting in the same way as in a Cournot model. On the basis of this additional knowledge, the leader is looking for 
optimum production. In this case, the first operator is the leader, and the second is a follower. 
Profit leader will look like this: 
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to zero, we find the optimal production leader: 
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The production volume of a follower will be: 
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The total output in this case will be: 
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The equilibrium price will be: 
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In this case, the leader sells in the market with twice as much than a follower. The prices are lowered, compared 
with Cournot equilibrium, the profit of the leader rises to the maximum possible (in the absence of collusion). 
This model has assumed that in the market there are two competitors: a leader and a follower. However, in practice, 
in a specific segment of the market could be more than two competing operators. And the roles of leaders and followers 
may be very different. Therefore, it is necessary to consider possible options for the hierarchy of the competition with 
this model. 
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4. Strategy of followers 
First, consider the situation where a single operator is the leader, and the others maximizes their profits, based on 
the Cournot model ( *vv...v n2  ). 
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This situation can be seen from the perspective of single competitive forces (in this case, forces followers). If the 
operator has mastered market segment and took the position of the leader, then all competitors-followers can be 
considered as a whole. The operator-leader, regardless of the number of competitors, behaves like a monopolist: 
.
b2
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Followers will share the remaining part of the market: 
.
2nb
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The total volume of services will be as follows: 
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The price of a leader: 
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In case the operator is one of the few followers against the leader, then you should first calculate the market share 
of the group's followers, and then, within this percentage, calculate volumes of services of the operator and the 
followers in position of balance or internal (second) leader and followers. 
As a leader's profit significantly more than the profits of followers, chances are someone from followers will 
become the leader. However, if the leaders would be at least two, the potential volume of supplied and services 
rendered by will be so great that the price will fall below the unit cost of services, and all companies will suffer losses. 
5. Strategy of a struggle for leadership 
Consider the fourth case - a struggle for leadership. Attempts to become a leader may not be limited to the simple 
establishment of sales: if competitors behave similarly, such sales are not the best choice. However, we must not forget 
(this is the position of the leader) that the increase of its own supplies reduces the supplies competitors. In this case, 
each of the operators believes himself to be the leader and maximizes profit: 
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Deciding the system of equations for the n operators, we get the following scope of services: 
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General scope of services and the price will be: 
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6. Practical application of the model 
Thus, having the equation of demand in the market of telecommunication services and the unit cost for the operator 
and its rivals, using the dependencies, you can find the best rate, the share of telecommunications services operator, 
and therefore the indicators of its effectiveness under different conditions of competition. The developed model was 
tested on the example of the connection block of flats to the Internet of small telecommunication operator «Aksinet» 
(Russian Federation, Kursk) in the presence of the two competitors (conditionally call them X1 and X2).  
On the basis of marketing research information is available on the ratio of price and demand for services (Table 1). 
                            Table 1. Demand for telecommunication services. 
Observation The number of subscribers Rate rubles/month 
1  290 350 
2 280 380 
3 230 410 
4 150 440 
                                                             Source: selected by Leontyev E. 
Find a and b for each equation of demand (for example, the method of Ordinary Least Squares) (Figure 1): 
541,41a  , 0,5743b  . The potential scope of services will be expressed through the amount of operator and its 
competitors in equation 1. Cost of connection for each of the three operators also known: 321,rAksinet   348,rX1   
330.rX2   
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                                     Source: getting by Leontyev E. 
Fig. 1. Demand for telecommunication services. 
Situation 1. The simultaneous development of the area the operator and its competitors. It is expected that each of 
them operates by maximizing their profits, not taking into account the fact that the others will react and change their 
volumes of output of services. 
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Consider the possible behaviors of operator in a competitive environment. 
Situation 2. The operator and its competitors come on the market, the operator takes a leading position and 
competitors-followers. 
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Situation 3. The operator acts as a follower. 
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Situation 4. The follower is sticking to its strategy of response to a certain point, and then with some quantitative 
decision appeared to rival leader adapts its services to maximum level (strives to be the leader). 
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The simulation results are summarized in Table 2. 
 Table 2. Modelling the performance of "Aksinet" with alternative marketing strategies. 
Strategy Clients Price, rubles Profit, thousands rubles 
1. Simultaneous independent development 108 346 2,7 
2. Leader 215 371 10,8 
3. Followers 72 371 3,6 
4. Struggle for leadership 129 309 (- 1,5) 
Source: calculated by Leontyev E. 
7. Conclusions  
You can see that the most effective strategy of a leader for the operator (Fig. 2). If he fails to occupy a leading 
position, the follower strategy will also be a good (due to high tariff more advantageous strategy of simultaneous 
independent development). If the operator decides to fight for the position of leader - dumping policy will bring the 
loss of project. 
The application of the proposed model allows the management of a small operator takes positions on the market in 
advance, design and implement the optimal (economic criteria) development strategy in the development of new 
market segments even in conditions of high competition. 
You can see that the most effective strategy of a leader for the operator and with this demand, the optimal price is 
371 ruble; the profit of the operator is the maximum 10750 rubles. However, if he fails to take such a position, the 
successor strategy will also be profitable (due to fare better at the independent development). With such a demand if 
the operator decides to fight for the position of leader - dumping policy will bring the loss of project. 
On the basis of the received results, management staff of small operator can act proactively and find the most 
efficient model of behavior in each case in the development of new market segments (find the best rate and proportion 
of communications services operator in order to obtain the maximum profit). 
With the equation of demand in the market of telecommunication services and the unit cost for the operator and its 
rivals, using these models, you can find the best rate, the share of telecommunications services of the operator, and 
therefore the indicators of its effectiveness under different conditions of competition. 
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                                               Source: getting by Plotnikov V. 
Fig. 2. Clients of operator in different strategies. 
The obtained model estimation of competitive environment allows: 
 The operators take a position in a segment proactively 
 Take into account more than two operators on the market 
 Take various unit cost of services from competitors 
We recommend to use our results in the management of the telecommunications sector. They can be used in systems 
management of small businesses. Also, public authorities can use them (in the case of development and 
implementation of state support for small business, in particular, in the training of specialists for the industry as part 
of public-private partnerships) (Vertakova and Plotnikov, 2014). 
Please title your files in this order ‘procedia acronym_conference acronym_authorslastname’. Submit both the 
source file and the PDF to the Guest Editor. 
Acknowledgements 
This paper was carried out within the state scientific task No 26.2671.2014/K "Theoretical and methodological 
basis for the development and implementation of a cluster-based policy at the regional level and scientific and 
methodological foundations of the tools of the structural benchmarks of the regional social and economical system”. 
References 
Brackman, S., Heijdra, B.J., 2001. The Monopolistic Competition Revolution in Retrospect. Cambridge University Press. 
Daughety, A.F., 1989. Cournot Oligopoly: Characterization and Applications. Cambridge University Press. 
Kalashnikov, V.V.; Flores, D., 2012. Application of the Cournot and Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Models for Mexican Real Estate Market. Springer. 
Meyer, M.W., 1978. Environments and Organizations (The Jossey-Bass social and behavioral science series). Proquest Info & Learning. 
Potapenko, A.M.; Leontyev, E.D., 2013. Generalized model of evaluation of small telecommunication operator. World Applied Sciences Journal 
28 (3), 416-420. 
Russia in figures, 2014. Federal State Statistics Service. Moscow. 
Samuelson, P.A.; Nordhaus, W.D., 2009. Microeconomics, 19th Edition. McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
Samuelson, P.A.; Nordhaus, W.D., 1998. Economics. McGraw-Hill Companies. 
Vertakova, Yu.; Plotnikov, V., 2013a. Theoretical aspects of considering the dynamic characteristics of socioeconomic systems in the management 
of regional development. Regional Research of Russia 1 (3), 89-95. 
Vertakova, Yu.; Plotnikov, V., 2013b. Russian and Foreign Experience of Interaction Between Government and Business. World Applied Sciences 
Journal 28 (3), 411-415.  
Vertakova, Yu.; Plotnikov, V., 2014. Public-private partnerships and the specifics of their implementation in vocational education. Procedia 
Economics and Finance 16, 24-33. 
108
215
72
129 1. Simultaneous independent
development
2. Leader
3. Followers
4. Struggle for leadership
